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INTRODUCTION: FROM NUREMBERG TO KANO
A. The Birth of Informed Consent

The principle of “informed consent” forms one of the “basic ethical protections
for research involving human participants.” 2 Informed consent requires that a human
subject of scientific research “willingly verif[y] his/her willingness to participate in a
particular treatment, after having been informed of all aspects which are pertinent to
that treatment and relevant to the subject's participation.” 3 Governments around the
world have adopted a variety of regulations 4 that articulate and enforce this “oldest
and most universally accepted ethical standard in research.” 5 In the United States, the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FD&C) mandates that scientists who test
new drugs first inform human subjects about the experimental nature of the studies
and obtain their consent.6 The U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the
federal agency charged with administering and enforcing the FD&C, 7 has
promulgated a series of regulations to implement this requirement.8
The informed consent requirement originated in the Nuremberg Trials following
World War II.9 Under the Third Reich in Germany, Nazi scientists conducted a
variety of involuntary and often fatal medical experiments on concentration camp
inmates,10 mainly Jews, Roma, and Slavs.11 After the war ended, the United States
2

Maxwell J. Mehlman & Jessica W. Berg, Human Subjects Protections in Biomedical
Enhancement Research, 36 J. L. MED & ETHICS 546, 552 (2008).
3

Jennifer J. Couture, The Changes in Informed Consent in Experimental Procedures: The
Evolution of a Concept, 1 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 125, 126 n.6 (2005).
4

See id. at 133-60.

5

SONIA SHAH, THE BODY HUNTERS: TESTING NEW DRUGS
PATIENTS 147 (2006).

ON THE

WORLD‟S POOREST

6

See 21 U.S.C. § 355(i)(4) (2008).

7

See PETER BARTON HUTT ET AL., FOOD AND DRUG LAW 4 (3d ed. 2007).

8

See 21 C.F.R. §§ 50.20-50.27, 312.120(a) (2010).

9

See Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163, 177 (9th Cir. 2009); see also Couture, supra
note 3, at 128-129.
10

See SHAH, supra note 5, at 69. A brief description can only begin to convey the horror
of these studies:
Eager to understand how the human body functioned at high altitudes, [Nazi
scientists] encased subjects in decompression chambers, pumped all the air out, and
then dissected the subjects while still alive to study their lungs. To see firsthand the
effects of dehydration they starved subjects and forced them to drink only saltwater.
They injected children with gasoline. They removed their subjects‟ bones and limbs . .
. Inmates were injected with phenol to see how long it would take them to die.
Id.
11

George J. Annas, The Changing Landscape of Human Experimentation: Nuremberg,
Helsinki, and Beyond, 2 HEALTH MATRIX 119, 121 (1992). By performing these “medical
atrocities,” Nazi doctors sought to aid the German war effort, eliminate what they regarded as
inferior races, and gain “scientific insight.” Couture, supra note 3, at 127-28.

2012]

BEYOND NUREMBERG

125

prosecuted twenty Nazi scientists12 before the International Military Tribunal in
Nuremberg, Germany for war crimes and crimes against humanity. 13 Ultimately,
seven of the Nazi scientists were sentenced to death and eight to varying prison
terms.14 As part of its final judgment, the Tribunal promulgated a set of ten
principles, later known as the “Nuremberg Code,” that provided the first
international rules for scientific research on human subjects.15 The Nuremberg
Code‟s first and most important principle 16 directed:
The voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely essential. This
means that the person involved should have legal capacity to give
consent; should be so situated as to be able to exercise free power of
choice . . . and should have sufficient knowledge and comprehension of
the elements of the subject matter involved as to enable him to make an
understanding and enlightened decision.17
Later international guidelines, such as the World Medical Association‟s 1964
“Declaration of Helsinki,”18 provided further direction for medical researchers.
Nevertheless, the Nuremberg Code “remains the most authoritative legal and ethical
document governing international research standards.”19 Supreme Court Justice
William Brennan once remarked, “[t]he medical trials at Nuremberg in 1947 deeply
impressed upon the world that experimentation with unknowing human subjects is
morally and legally unacceptable.”20
B. Global Challenges to Informed Consent
The globalization of the pharmaceutical industry, especially the clinical testing
process for new drugs, 21 has undermined enforcement of the informed consent
requirement. When the FDA first began to regulate clinical studies in the 1960s, it
hesitated to approve new drugs based on research conducted abroad, which caused
pharmaceutical companies to rarely sponsor overseas trials. 22 But as the FDA
12

SHAH, supra note 5, at 69.

13

See Abdullahi, 562 F.3d at 177-78.

14

See Abdullahi, 562 F.3d at 178.

15

See Couture, supra note 3, at 129.

16

See id.; SHAH, supra note 5, at 71.

17

The Nuremberg Code, THE NAZI DOCTORS AND THE NUREMBERG CODE: HUMAN RIGHTS
3 (George J. Annas & Michael A. Grodin eds., 1992).

IN HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION
18

Declaration of Helsinki Recommendations Guiding Doctors in Clinical Research, THE
NAZI DOCTORS AND THE NUREMBERG CODE: HUMAN RIGHTS IN HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION
331-42 (George J. Annas & Michael A. Grodin eds., 1992).
19

Annas, supra note 11, at 121.

20

United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 687 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
21

See Ileana Dominguez-Urban, Harmonization in the Regulation of Pharmaceutical
Research and Human Rights: The Need to Think Globally, 30 CORNELL INT‟L L.J. 245, 245
(1997).
22

PETER BARTON HUTT ET AL., FOOD AND DRUG LAW 650 (3d ed. 2007).
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gradually liberalized this policy, especially in its 1994 decision to allow new drug
applications based entirely on foreign research data, 23 the industry responded by
moving its experiments offshore. The number of foreign investigators seeking FDA
approval for new drugs increased sixteen-fold over the 1990s, while U.S.-based
researchers declined.24 In 1999, over a quarter of new drugs approved by the FDA
were first tested abroad,25 and by 2008 that figure had jumped to more than three
quarters of new drugs.26
Pharmaceutical companies based in First World countries have sought to conduct
their research in the Third World,27 drawn by lower costs and a more permissive
regulatory environment.28 The most popular new locations for foreign studies are
developing regions such as the former Soviet Union, Latin America, India, China,
South East Asia, and Africa.29 Between 1995 and 2005, U.S. pharmaceutical
companies conducted nearly one-third of their clinical studies in poor and lowincome countries, and by 2005, approximately 40% of all international clinical trials
occurred in these developing regions.30 One journalist explained, “rich countries

23

See 21 C.F.R. § 314.106(b)(1) (1994).

24

SHAH, supra note 5, at 7.

25

Mary Pat Flaherty et al., Testing Tidal Wave Hits Overseas, WASH. POST (Dec. 18,
2000), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/10/01/AR200810010111
7.html; see also Yevgenia Shtilman, Pharmaceutical Drug Testing in the Former Soviet
Union, 29 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 425, 434 (2009).
26
Gardiner Harris, Concern Over Foreign Trials for Drugs Sold in U.S., N.Y. TIMES (June
21, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/22/health/research/22trial.html.
27

This Article uses the terms “Third World,” “developing world,” and variations thereof,
interchangeably. They refer to poor and low-income regions, such as Africa, India, Southeast
Asia, as well as parts of China, Latin America, and the former Soviet Union, where an
increasing amount of human subject research takes place.
28

See Mary Pat Flaherty et al., Testing Tidal Wave Hits Overseas, WASH. POST (Dec. 18,
2000), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/10/01/AR200810010111
7.html; see also William Dubois, New Drug Research, The Extraterritorial Application of
FDA Regulations, and the Need for International Cooperation, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT‟L L.
161, 167-68 (2003).
29
See SHAH, supra note 5, at 7; Shtilman, supra note 25, at 434; Office of Inspector
General, Dep‟t of Health and Human Servs., The Globalization of Clinical Trials: A Growing
Challenge in Protecting Human Subjects 8-11 (Sept. 2001), available at
http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-01-00-00190.pdf. For instance, a survey of the clinical trials
reported in leading medical journals in 1995 and 2005 found that the number of studies
conducted in Africa, Eastern Europe, Russia, and the Middle East had approximately doubled,
while trials in the United States decreased by more than 10% and in Western Europe by nearly
5%. See Seth W. Glickman et al., Ethical and Scientific Implications of the Globalization of
Clinical Research, 8 NEW ENG. J. MED. 816, 818 (2009).
30

See Volnei Garrafa et al., Between the Needy and the Greedy: The Quest for a Just and
Fair Ethics of Clinical Research, 36 J. MED. ETHICS 500, 500-01 (2010).
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have the drugs and hypotheses, while poor countries have vast numbers of
patients.”31
Yet the “outsourcing” of medical research to the Third World has made it more
difficult to regulate the ethics of human subject research. There are no binding
international treaties that regulate human experimentation, 32 and the international
ethical guidelines, such as the Nuremberg Code, lack any sanctions or enforcement
mechanisms.33 Government regulators in the Third World are “generally ill-equipped
to oversee, much less manage, the clinical trials being held within their borders.”34
Moreover, these poorer countries have “strong incentives to encourage leniency in
national and local oversight of the research” 35 to attract drug companies and obtain
the financial benefits of clinical studies.36 The “resulting „regulatory vacuum‟ makes
it difficult to ensure the welfare of trial participants,” 37 and effectively permits
inadvertent, or even intentional, abuse of human subjects. 38 A series of recent
headline articles in the Washington Post revealed that, in several instances,
pharmaceutical companies had conducted clinical trials in the Third World in which
researchers forged consent forms, lied to subjects about the nature of the study, or
failed to reveal the potential dangers of the experimental drugs. 39 Unfortunately,
cases like these may not constitute isolated aberrations—a 1996 study found that
nearly half of the clinical trials conducted in Chile that year suffered from “ethical
problems,” most commonly a failure to obtain the subjects‟ consent. 40 In addition,
international variations in acceptable experimental protocols allow for studies in the
31

Mary Pat Flaherty & Doug Struck, Life by Luck of the Draw, WASH. POST (Dec. 22,
2000), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/10/01/AR200810010118
8.html.
32

See Dominguez-Urban, supra note 21, at 273.

33

See id. at 273-74.

34

See Shtilman, supra note 25, at 436.

35

See id. at 435.

36

See Robert Gatter, Conflicts of Interest in International Human Drug Research and the
Insufficiency of International Protections, 32 AM. J.L. & MED. 351, 353 (2006).
37

See Shtilman, supra note 25, at 436.

38

See Dominguez-Urban, supra note 21, at 270- 71.

39

See Karen De Young et al., Latin America Is Ripe for Trials, and Fraud, WASH. POST.
(Dec.
21,
2000),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A31027-2000Dec20
(explaining that researchers forged consent forms to test the drug cariporide on subjects
without their consent, leading to the deaths of several participants); John Pomfret & Deborah
Nelson, An Isolated Region’s Genetic Mother Lode, WASH. POST. (Dec. 20, 2000),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/10/01/AR2008100101158.html
(indicating that researchers falsely promised free healthcare to impoverished Chinese villagers
to draw their blood for genetic study, without explaining the purpose of the experiment);
Sharon LaFraniere et al., The Dilemma: Submit or Suffer, WASH. POST. (Dec. 19, 2000),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/10/01/AR20081001011 50.html
(reporting that researchers failed to inform study participants of the FDA‟s concerns about the
drug Zeldox‟s effect on heart rhythms and its refusal to approve the drug pending more safety
tests).
40

See LaFraniere et al., supra note 39.
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Third World that would not satisfy First World regulatory scrutiny. 41 Even in the
absence of clear ethical violations, language barriers and cultural differences
between First World scientists and Third World human subjects make it difficult for
investigators to ensure that their patients legitimately consented to participating in
research.42
One high profile case of allegedly unethical pharmaceutical research occurred in
Kano, Nigeria in 1996, when the American drug company Pfizer, Inc. sponsored a
study of the experimental drug Trovan on hundreds of children during a meningitis
outbreak in Northern Nigeria.43 After eleven children died and many more were
injured,44 a group of Nigerian children and their guardians sued Pfizer in an
American court, claiming that the company had tested the drug on them without
disclosing the experimental nature or dangers of the research.45 The lawsuit
ultimately led to the Second Circuit case of Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc.,46 in which the
court declared that the prohibition on nonconsensual medical research constituted a
universally accepted norm of international law, 47 and held that violation of this
norm—even when it occurred abroad—was sufficiently heinous to support the
universal jurisdiction of an American court. 48 The Second Circuit concluded “the
norm prohibiting nonconsensual medical experimentation on human subjects has
become firmly embedded and has secured universal acceptance in the community of
nations.”49 The Abdullahi decision offered a source of both hope and despair—half a
century after the Nuremberg Trial first announced the principle of informed consent,
and the requirement became a widely accepted tenant of international law, violations
continued to occur in the Third World.
C. Proposal for a Critique of Informed Consent in Third World Research
Concerns about the welfare of human subjects in developing countries have led
activists, academics, and government officials in the United States to call for
reinforcement of the informed consent requirement in Third World pharmaceutical
research.50 This paper offers a critical analysis of that approach. Although the
41

See Dubois, supra note 28, at 168. For instance, an American pharmaceutical company
sponsored a study in Hungary of an anti-psychotic drug on mental patients confined to locked
wards—an accepted local practice that United States regulators would not tolerate due to the
possibility of coercing consent. See LaFraniere et al., supra note 39.
42

See id.

43

See Dubois, supra note 28, at 163-64.

44

Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163, 169 (9th Cir. 2009).

45

See id.

46

Id.

47

See id. at 183-84.

48

See id. at 177, 187.

49

Id. at 183-84 (emphasis added).

50

See, e.g., Food and Drug Administration, NIH Sees More Ethical Problems with
Foreign IRBs; Steps Up Training, FDA WEEK (Mar. 17, 2006) (indicating that activist group
Public Citizen condemns government decision to view foreign ethical standards as equivalent
to U.S. requirements); Ruqaiijah Yearby, Good Enough to Use for Research, But Not Good
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assurance of experimental subjects‟ voluntary participation in Third World clinical
studies is certainly a laudable goal, a rights-based notion of autonomous consent
ignores the actual context in which that consent takes place—a terrain defined by the
absence of essential medical treatment, desperation for healthcare, and important
cultural differences. These circumstances belie the notion of an inalienable and
universal right to freely assent to medical experimentation. As an alternative, this
paper proposes that advocates concerned about the interests of human subjects in
developing countries address the distributive consequences of globalized
pharmaceutical testing. This approach seeks to ensure that Third World citizens
enjoy the benefits of the clinical trials conducted in their communities.
This Article discusses the history of informed consent, critical analyzes this
principle, and suggests an alternative approach to informed consent. Part II explores
the concept of informed consent, including its philosophical bases, its
implementation through FDA regulations, and current proposals on how to protect
the principle in drug testing conducted abroad. Part III performs a critical analysis of
the principle of informed consent; first providing an empirical examination of the
realities of Third World human subject research, and then questioning both the
coherence of an abstract “right” to informed consent, as well as the possibility of
truly autonomous “consent” to such research. In Part IV, this Article suggests an
alternative approach based on the principle of distributive justice, in which
pharmaceutical companies ensure that the communities that bear the risks of clinical
studies also enjoy the medical benefits of such research. Finally, Part V provides a
brief conclusion and reflects on the implications of this critique.
II. THE PRINCIPLE OF INFORMED CONSENT: THEORY, POLICY, AND ADVOCACY
This section provides background on the principle of informed consent. Part A
explores the theoretical bases of the informed consent requirement to reveal the
philosophical assumptions on which it relies. Part B demonstrates that, in addition to
the lack of international or local regulation of Third World clinical studies, the FDA
applies a lower informed consent standard for foreign research. Finally, Part C
recounts the proposals advocated by legal and medical scholars who seek to protect
human subjects in the Third World by reinforcing the informed consent requirement.
A. The Theoretical Bases of Informed Consent
The principle of informed consent in human subject research is not a self-evident
axiom of medical ethics, but instead relies on several philosophical assumptions.
Grounded in “notions of liberal individualism, as expressed by eighteenth and
nineteenth century Western philosophers,” the informed consent requirement draws
predominantly on the moral principle of “personal autonomy.” 51 Personal autonomy
ideals hold that one‟s “personal self-governance” should be “free from control or
Enough to Benefit from the Results of that Research, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1127, 1150 (2004)
(calling for the creation of a compulsory international standard of ethical protections for
human subject research, to be drafted, implemented, and enforced through an international
body); Office of Inspector General, supra note 29, at iii (recommending that the FDA
encourage more rigorous monitoring of foreign research sites by sponsors to ensure human
subject protections).
51

Elysa Gordon, Multiculturalism in Medical Decisionmaking: The Notion of Informed
Waiver, 23 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1321, 1326-27 (1996).
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interference by others.”52 This principle thus relies on two more fundamental
assumptions: that all human beings have an individual right to self-governance and
that all human beings have the ability to freely choose their own destinies. 53 The
informed consent requirement similarly depends on these two theoretical bases.
The informed consent requirement draws on the notion of inalienable and
universal individual rights. First, it functions in the same way that legal philosopher
Ronald Dworkin defined a “political right”—as a kind of “trump” over any
otherwise “decisive,” collective, or utilitarian justification. 54 It protects the
individual‟s privilege to consent to participation in a clinical study and ensures that it
is predominant over any competing government, scientific, or societal interest in the
medical research.55 Thus, the Nuremberg Code mandates the principle of informed
consent to “protect[] individual subjects first by protecting their rights.” 56 Indeed, the
Nuremberg Code refers to the voluntary participation of human subjects in scientific
research as “absolutely essential.”57 Senator Jacob Javitz of New York, who
sponsored the amendment that first mandated the informed consent requirement for
research submitted to the FDA, similarly emphasized the importance of limiting the
acceptable procedures of medical study to protect the individual right to informed
consent:
I am for experimentation. I feel deeply that some risks must be assumed
in experimentation. But we must hold the balance between personal
dignity and personal responsibility and the right of the individual to know
how his life is being disposed of, at least with his consent, and the virtues
of experimentation.58
Second, the informed consent principle operates in the same way that Dworkin
defined a universal right: an argument that may be asserted “against any collective
justification in any circumstances reasonably likely to be found in political
society.”59 Indeed, the Nuremberg judges based their declaration on “a natural law
theory, deriv[ed] from universal moral, ethical, and legal concepts.”60 Moreover, the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights specifically articulates the
informed consent requirement as one of the “inalienable rights of all members of the

52

Id. at 1325.

53
See id. (“Autonomy acknowledges that all human beings have a capacity for moral
dignity and that those who possess moral dignity are determiners of their own destinies.”).
54

RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 364-65 (1978).

55

See Gordon, supra note 51, at 1344.

56

Annas, supra note 11, at 121.

57

The Nuremberg Code, supra note 17.

58
108 CONG. REC. 17,397 (1962) (statement of Sen. Javits), reprinted in 22 A
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL FOOD, DRUG & COSMETIC ACT AND ITS AMENDMENTS
325 (1979).
59

DWORKIN, supra note 54, at 365.

60

Annas, supra note 11, at 121.
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human family . . . derive[d] from the inherent dignity of the human person.”61 The
covenant also declares: “no one shall be subjected without his free consent to
medical or scientific experimentation.” 62 The Second Circuit‟s holding in Abdullahi,
that Pfizer‟s sponsorship of nonconsensual medical research in Nigeria constituted a
violation of human rights sufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of an American court, 63
further reflects this universal conception of the principle of informed consent.
Informed consent draws on a theory of inalienable and universal individual rights
that transcend both collective interests and cultural contexts.
The principle of informed consent also assumes an individual‟s ability to exercise
freedom of choice. Absent a belief in a person‟s ability to freely decide to volunteer
for medical research, informed consent would amount to a meaningless protection.
Thus, the informed consent requirement “reflect[s] a belief that an individual has a
right to be free from nonconsensual interference with his or her person, and a basic
moral principle that it is wrong to force another to act against his or her will.” 64 For
instance, the Nuremberg Code emphasizes that a human subject must be “so situated
as to be able to exercise free power of choice” and that he or she must be provided
sufficient information about the study so “as to enable him to make an understanding
and enlightened decision.”65 Similarly, Senator Javits invoked the importance of
personal decision-making in human subject research:
If . . . we cannot tell a mature adult who is going to be used for
experimentation with a drug which has not yet been reasonably
demonstrated to be safe and who is well able to come to the decision that
he wants it himself . . . where is the dignity, the responsibility, and the
freedom of the individual? 66
In addition, the FDA has promulgated more stringent requirements for clinical
studies that involve children who may be too young to legitimately choose to
consent.67 Finally, courts have held that a physician is not liable for violating the
informed consent requirement if she fails to provide subjects with information that
would not have affected their decision to participate.68 In other words, informed
consent calibrates the mandatory disclosure of information on the basis of its
relevance to the subject‟s choice to join an experimental study. The notion that
individuals are capable of making the autonomous decision to participate in
scientific research, and that protection of this autonomy ensures an important
freedom, provides the second philosophical basis for the informed consent
61

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Preamble, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (Mar.
23, 1976).
62

Id. at art. 7.

63

See Abdullahi, 562 F.3d at 177, 187.

64

BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW 75 (6th ed. 2008).

65

The Nuremberg Code, supra note 17.

66

Statement of Sen. Javits, supra note 58, at 325.

67

See 21 C.F.R. § 50.55 (2010).

68

See, e.g., Plumber v. Dep‟t of Health & Human Res., 634 So. 2d 1347, 1351 (La. Ct.
App. 1994).
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requirement.69 The principle of informed consent seeks to protect the ideal of
“personal autonomy” celebrated by Western liberal philosophy. It ultimately rests on
the theoretical foundations of individual rights and freedom of choice.
B. The FDA’s Informed Consent Policies for Foreign Research
As previously discussed, there are no binding international treaties governing
human subject research, and Third World governments are often either unable or
unwilling to effectively police the studies that occur within their borders. Instead,
First World countries that house the pharmaceutical companies and consume the
tested drugs provide the principal source of consistent regulatory authority for Third
World medical research.70 The United States, home to the largest pharmaceutical
market in the world,71 offers an important example. A pharmaceutical manufacturer
that wishes to sell a drug in the United States must first submit a new drug
application (NDA) to the FDA.72 According to the FD&C, the applicant must submit
“substantial evidence” that the drug is safe and effective based on “adequate and
well-controlled investigations, including clinical investigations.” 73 The FDA requires
that all medical research performed to market a drug in the United States satisfy the
principle of informed consent.74 Its regulations, however, prescribe differing
standards and enforcement of this requirement depending on whether the clinical
studies are conducted domestically or abroad.
To regulate clinical studies that are conducted within the United States, the FDA
has promulgated an extensive set of guidelines known as the “investigational new
drug process” (IND).75 These regulations dictate, inter alia, the organization of the
phases of clinical study, the experimental protocols used in the individual trials, the
responsibilities of both the investigators and the sponsors involved in the research,
and the format of the submitted data.76 An “institutional review board” (IRB) must
oversee and approve the research for compliance with FDA regulations.77 The IND
process specifically requires that investigators obtain the informed consent of every
human subject who participates in their study, 78 and even prescribes the form and
conditions in which investigators may obtain that consent. First, investigators may
only seek an individual‟s consent “under circumstances that provide the prospective
subject . . . sufficient opportunity to consider whether or not to participate and that
69

RUTH R. FADEN ET AL., A HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED CONSENT 7-8 (1986).

70

See Dominguez-Urban, supra note 21, at 270.

71

See id. at 245.

72

See 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2008).

73

21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (2008).

74

See 21 C.F.R. §§ 312.60, 312.120(a)(1) (2010).

75

See 21 C.F.R. § 312 (2010); HUTT, supra note 7, at 624.

76
See 21 C.F.R. §§ 312.20-70 (2010). The FDA‟s power to mandate these guidelines
comes from its ability to exempt researchers from the usual prohibition on the shipment of
unapproved drugs to conduct clinical studies. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(i) (2008).
77

21 C.F.R. § 312.66 (2010).

78

See 21 C.F.R. § 312.60 (2010).
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minimize the possibility of coercion or undue influence.” 79 Next, to inform the
participants about the nature of the research, the investigators must give each
potential subject, “in language understandable to [them],” 80 eight basic elements of
information regarding the study81 along with six additional elements when
appropriate.82 Finally, the investigators must document each subject‟s written
consent in a signed form and provide each subject with a copy of his or her form. 83
Children receive additional informed consent protections. 84 The sponsors of clinical
trials are responsible for monitoring the research and ensuring compliance with the
IND regulations, including the informed consent requirements. 85 The FD&C defines
violation of these informed consent standards as a “[p]rohibited act,” 86 against which
the FDA may bring injunction proceedings87 or criminal prosecutions.88
Clinical studies conducted outside of the United States may advance through one
of two pathways for FDA acceptance. First, they may proceed through the IND
process, which “bring[s] the investigator, regardless of the location of the research,
under the federal regulations governing the conduct of research in the United
States.”89 Second, investigators and sponsors may choose to conduct their foreign
research independently.90 In this alternative pathway, the FDA does not directly
regulate the research, but requires as a condition for acceptance that the study be
“conducted in accordance with good clinical practice,” including “obtaining and
documenting the freely given informed consent of the subject.” 91 The phrase “good
clinical practice” (GCP) comes from the human experimentation guidelines
79
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time without penalty. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 50.25(a)(1)-(8) (2010).
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promulgated by the International Conference on Harmonization of Technical
Requirements for Registration of Pharmaceuticals for Human Use in 1995, at which
the United States, the European Union, and Japan attempted to harmonize their
pharmaceutical development regulations. 92 The FDA further requires that an
“independent ethics committee,” similar to an IRB, 93 oversee and approve foreign
research conducted outside of an IND.94 Although the FDA will not accept a foreign
study that fails to either fulfill the GCP requirements or document its subjects‟
informed consent, it will still “examine data from such a study.” 95
The FDA imposes a higher standard of informed consent, and provides greater
enforcement of that requirement, for clinical trials performed domestically than for
research conducted outside of the United States. First, the IND informed consent
standards are more rigorous than the GCP requirements. 96 The IND provisions
dictate the circumstances under which investigators may seek subjects‟ consent, the
language they should use, and the elements of information they must provide. 97 Yet
the GCP standard merely mandates that investigators inform subjects “of all aspects
of the trial that are relevant to [their] decision to participate” and document their
consent “by means of a written informed consent form.” 98 These “extremely vague”
requirements provide subjects with “significantly less assurance that actual informed
consent will be obtained.”99
Second, the FDA subjects research performed under an IND to more stringent
enforcement of the informed consent requirements than foreign research conducted
outside an IND. The FDA has the authority to directly enforce the IND informed
consent standards through injunctions and criminal prosecutions. 100 It has previously
sent warning letters threatening to bring such proceedings when investigators and

92
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sponsors under an IND failed to satisfy its informed consent requirements. 101 In
contrast, the GCP informed consent standards for foreign trials conducted outside of
an IND are only a condition of acceptance for the research102—investigators and
sponsors suffer no penalties for violations other than rejection of the flawed study.
Indeed, although it will not officially accept the study, the FDA “will examine data”
from foreign research conducted outside of an IND that violates the GCP informed
consent requirements.103 Although the FDA requires adherence to the informed
consent principle for all research submitted in support of an NDA, the fact that
foreign researchers may choose whether to submit to the stricter IND rules or
proceed according to the less rigorous GCP guidelines means that FDA regulations
effectively provide less stringent application of the informed consent standard for
medical research conducted outside of the United States.
C. The Advocacy for Informed Consent in Third World Research
In response to the lack of regulation of Third World research and the resulting
ethical violations in places like Kano, commentators in both the legal and medical
communities have sought to protect human subjects by advocating for the
reinforcement of the informed consent principle. Their suggestions comprise a wide
variety of approaches, including international collaboration, national legislation, and
private action.104 The proposed reforms, however, can broadly be grouped into three
main strategies that all seek to strengthen the informed consent standard in Third
World clinical studies: improved standards, increased monitoring of medical
research, and more rigorous enforcement of the requirement. 105
Commentators have advocated several ways to strengthen the substance of the
informed consent standard as applied in the developing world. At the most basic
level, scholars have called for the FDA to apply a more rigorous informed consent
requirement to research abroad and to give human rights groups a voice in the
formulation of this standard.106 Commentators have also proposed that international
institutions or state governments articulate clearer and more binding informed
consent requirements—for example, through a United Nations Covenant on Human
Experimentation107 or the promulgation of ethics guidelines by the Third World
nations that host medical research.108 Academics from the field of medicine have
also suggested that the informed consent standard take account of cultural, social,
101
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and linguistic differences between the First and Third Worlds by integrating local
communities into the determination of the requirement‟s content.109 In addition,
scholars have proposed reform of the process for obtaining informed consent,
advocating the use of alternative media, more thorough documentation, and the
involvement of communication experts to ensure that participants fully understand
the nature of the research. 110 Finally, legal commentators have proposed a theoretical
reconceptualization of the standard, suggesting that property law may provide an
alternative basis for the informed consent requirement that would better protect the
bodily integrity of research subjects.111 All these reforms seek to reinforce the
principle of informed consent by improving the content of the legal standard that
implements it.
Commentators have also argued for increased monitoring of clinical trials in the
Third World. For example, the Office of Inspector General for the Department of
Health and Human Services recommended that the FDA encourage pharmaceutical
companies to perform more rigorous oversight of their foreign research sites‟ human
subject protections.112 Scholars have also suggested that international health
organizations and other non-governmental groups use new communication and
media technologies to provide greater surveillance of clinical research in the
developing world.113 Both legal and medical scholars have proposed strengthening
the independence and capacity of the ethics committees and review boards in the
Third World that provide local supervision for clinical research. 114 At the most
extreme, advocates have called for the international centralization of the ethical
oversight for medical research through the mandatory registration of clinical trials
with the World Health Organization.115 These proposals all seek to ensure adherence
to the informed consent requirement by expanding oversight of drug testing in
developing countries.
Finally, scholars have proposed more rigorous enforcement of the informed
consent standard in the Third World through a variety of legal mechanisms. One
scholar has hypothesized that the FDA might bring criminal prosecutions against

109
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pharmaceutical companies that sponsor unethical research.116 Alternatively, some
proposals would establish an international tribunal for human experimentation that
would enforce a code of ethics mandatory for all clinical studies. 117 In a different
vein, one commentator has suggested that the First World governments with the
most lucrative pharmaceutical markets—the United States, the European Union, and
Japan—should use the threat of market exclusion to deter drug companies from
sponsoring unethical research.118 Finally, several scholars have argued that the Alien
Tort Statute, which grants U.S. district courts subject matter jurisdiction over torts
arising from violations of international law, 119 could open U.S. domestic courts as a
forum for private enforcement of the informed consent standard.120 In general, all
these proposals seek to increase enforcement to deter future violations of the
informed consent requirement. Commentators concerned about the ethics of medical
research in the Third World have advocated for a variety of reforms that would
reinforce the principle of informed consent, primarily through development of the
substance of the legal standard, improvement in the level of oversight for clinical
trials in the developing world, and expansion of the mechanisms available to enforce
the requirement.
III. A CRITIQUE OF INFORMED CONSENT IN THIRD WORLD HUMAN SUBJECT
RESEARCH
This section critically analyzes the principle of informed consent in Third World
human subject research. Part A provides an empirical examination of the conditions
in which Third World medical experiments occur, to demonstrate that the informed
consent requirement operates in an environment defined by a lack of effective
healthcare and profound cultural diversity. Part B then critiques the notion of an
inalienable and universal “right” to informed consent, in light of human subjects‟
competing interest in accessing lifesaving medications and the uniquely Western
values underlying the requirement. Part C critiques the notion that “informed
consent” protects the free choice to submit to an experimental study, given that
desperation for effective medical treatment drives so many subjects to participate.
A. A Contextualization of Third World Research
The emphasis on reinforcing the principle of informed consent often fails to take
account of the actual context in which consent is given. The political, economic, and
116

See Dubois, supra note 28, at 165.

117

Sarah Bahir, An International Legal System Regulating the Trade in the Pharmaceutical
Sector and Services Provided by Human Subjects, 6 ASPER REV. INT‟L BUS. & TRADE L. 157,
170 (2006); see also Annas, supra note 11, at 137.
118

See Khan, supra note 113, at 909.

119

See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2008).

120

See, e.g., Samantha Evans, The Globalization of Drug Testing: Enforcing Informed
Consent Through the Alien Tort Claims Act, 19 TEMP. INT‟L & COMP. L.J. 477, 504 (2005);
Erin Talati, An Open Door to Ending Exploitation: Accountability for Violations of Informed
Consent Under the Alien Tort Statute, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 231, 277 (2006); Amy F.
Wollensack, Closing the Constant Garden: The Regulation and Responsibility of U.S.
Pharmaceutical Companies Doing Research on Human Subjects in Developing Nations, 6
WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 747, 769 (2007).

138

JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH

[Vol. 25:123

social frameworks of many Third World countries play an important role in
determining whether participants in medical experimentation actually enjoy the
intended benefits of the informed consent requirement. 121 An examination of the
circumstances in which human subjects in developing countries consent to
participate in clinical studies reveals an environment defined by a lack of access to
healthcare, desperation for medical treatment, and cultural unfamiliarity with
Western science and bioethics.122
Reliable medical care is often unavailable in the Third World. In poor and lowincome countries, “public health institutions have serious difficulties in providing
adequate health care, something that creates obstacles with regard to the recruitment,
training, and support of specialised [sic] healthcare professionals.” 123 While the
world‟s annual per capita expenditure on health is $639, and in the United States the
number climbs to over $6,000, in sub-Saharan Africa the same figure plummets to
$11, and for several countries in the region it is less than $4. 124 As a result, effective
healthcare is available in developing countries “only for populations belonging to the
highest social strata, and from which participation in clinical trials is rare.” 125
Approximately half of the Third World does not have access “to even the most basic
drugs,”126 and 80% must instead rely on traditional healers. 127 Journalist Sonia Shah
describes the widespread poverty and sickness at the University Teaching Hospital in
Lusaka, Zambia, where foreign researchers recruited children with AIDS and
infectious diarrhea for a trial of the drug nitazoxanide:
[T]housands of parents straggled into Lusaka‟s clinics and hospital,
clutching tiny bundles: their shrunken, malnourished babies and toddlers
whose innards, it seemed, were seeping out . . . Outside, the rutted roads
overflowing with water had turned into orange swamps . . . The toddlers
whose parents agreed to enroll them in the trial in Lusaka were extremely
ill. They‟d been plagued with diarrhea for days. Most were severely
underweight. Half were infected with HIV. The children were dying. 128
The lack of Western medicine is actually one of the reasons pharmaceutical
companies increasingly conduct their clinical studies in the Third World—it
121
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provides a vast pool of “treatment-naïve”129 human subjects who have not received
other medicines. Thus, it allows researchers to more clearly identify the tested drug‟s
effect.130 One recruiter of experimental subjects explained simply, “South Africa is a
great country. . . . There are lots of individuals [with AIDS] who are not treated.” 131
The lack of access to healthcare in the Third World creates desperation for
medical treatment that often drives the sick and impoverished to participate in
experimental research. The website for one pharmaceutical company boasts, “The
vast majority of people [in the Third World] have only the most basic healthcare . . .
[allowing] clinical trials [to] provide study participants with access to more
sophisticated medicine.”132 In fact, numerous surveys of the participants in Third
World clinical research have consistently revealed that the primary reason they join
the trials is to obtain healthcare.133 In a study of Ugandan parents who consented to
allow their children to participate in a trial of malaria treatment, the authors
concluded, “[m]any parents felt that they could not have refused to participate
because their child was sick and they either did not know or did not believe that their
child would receive treatment outside of the study.” 134 One participant in a diabetes
drug study in India explained, “[l]ook, I didn‟t have a stable job; insulin costs 1700
rupees a month. I have two daughters. And I weighed 49 kg.” 135 Moreover, clinical
trials in the Third World often involve disadvantaged and “socially vulnerable”
subjects136 who may be particularly desperate for treatment, such as drug addicts, sex
workers, and pregnant mothers.137 While research administrators have “expressed
concern that thorough informed consent would be overshadowed by patient
desperation for therapy,” one human subject recruiter admitted to exploiting the
situation:
Say you need 1,000 patients in your trial. If you tried Western Europe, it
would take you a long time to find untreated patients . . . [In a developing
country], you might find those patients in half the time . . . [as] the
healthcare systems aren‟t as sophisticated . . . [and] because of that, there
is an increased interest in accessing drugs via clinical research, and
therefore we can leverage that interest.138
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The U.S. Embassy in Beijing recently went so far as to “warn[] U.S. medical
researchers against working in impoverished, rural areas of China,” where “health
care is poor and people are unable to protect their rights.” 139 The lack of healthcare
often serves as an important motivating factor for the subjects of clinical research in
the Third World.
Despite their desire for First World medical treatment, the subjects of human
research in the developing world often come from cultures unfamiliar with the basic
concepts of Western science and bioethics. For instance, in some African languages,
there is no word for “research” or “science,” nor any concept of an “experiment” or a
“placebo control.”140 “In traditional societies, the concepts of research,
randomization, risks, side effects, and voluntary participation may be difficult for
researchers to explain and potential participants to grasp.”141 More complicated
scientific concepts are even more unfamiliar: “when language barriers exist and such
concepts as germ theory or viral agents are alien, a description of an AIDS-related
investigation . . . becomes difficult to relay to participants.” 142
European philosophical concepts may be similarly foreign to some Third World
societies. Many Bantu languages lack a term corresponding to the English word
“person,” instead conceiving of personhood in terms of one‟s tribe, village, or social
group.143 Rather than define selfhood by the Western emphasis on the individual, in
these cultures “it cannot be extricated from a dynamic system of social relationships,
both of kinship and of community as defined by the village.” 144 Political differences
also render basic notions of Western bioethics strange to test subjects in the
developing world. For instance:
[In] nations governed for decades by dictators and despots, the Western
concept of freedom of choice is weak or nonexistent . . . In countries
wracked by recent wars or oppressed by secret police, test subjects are
reluctant to sign their names to any document . . . Even in relatively
peaceful, stable countries in Asia and Latin America, authoritarian
cultural traditions can impede the process.145
Studies have confirmed that Third World research subjects frequently do not
understand the concept of informed consent, even when investigators follow the
proper procedures for obtaining it. 146 A survey of researchers working in the Third
World who actually came from those regions revealed overwhelming concern with
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the cultural appropriateness of U.S. ethical guidelines. 147 When human subjects in
the Third World give their informed consent to participate in clinical studies, they do
so in an environment defined by a lack of access to effective healthcare, a
desperation for medical treatment, and a culture unfamiliar with the principles of
Western science and bioethics.148
B. A Critique of the Right to Informed Consent in Third World Research
These background conditions render the notion of a cognizable “right” to
informed consent in Third World human subject research vulnerable to critical
analysis. An allegedly inalienable and universal principle of informed consent cannot
sustain itself in an environment defined by a lack of medical treatment and profound
cultural diversity. First, given the absence of effective healthcare in much of the
developing world, one must balance the informed consent standard against the right
of human subjects to access lifesaving drugs through participation in clinical
research—a contested question of policy, rather than an absolute ethical imperative.
Second, the uniquely Western notions underlying the informed consent requirement
render its enforcement in the Third World a kind of cultural imperialism, not a
universal responsibility.
Although, as previously discussed, advocates of the informed consent
requirement present it as an inalienable right that trumps all competing
considerations, in the Third World the principle conflicts with an equally compelling
right of access to essential medicine. Critical legal theorist Duncan Kennedy
explains that the promotion of a particular right nearly always confronts a
“counterright that can be asserted in the same tone of voice and that cancels out the
first right.”149 In fact, several legal commentators have advanced the notion of a
human right to access medical treatment.150 One scholar declares:
[T]he normative framework of human rights requires adequate progress to
fulfill universal access to essential medications. At a minimum in this
regard, international human rights law requires a clear plan to be made
and deliberate steps to be taken toward the progressive realization of the
right to health and does not permit policies or acts, even under pressure
from other actors, which would entail regression in terms of availability
or affordability of medications.151
Absolute insistence on the protection of the informed consent principle would seem
to conflict with this obligation. Given that current informed consent procedures
already require an “enormous effort” from investigators, who sometimes need as
147
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much as 45 minutes to counsel each human subject,152 many international health
advocates have deliberately avoided demanding reinforcement of ethical research
standards for fear of “imposing impossible demands and idealistic ethical standards
on companies that can easily take their business elsewhere.” 153 One bioethicist
explained, “It takes half a second to look at how much more burdened the
developing world is with ill health and disability. What we need, if anything, is more
health research in the developing world, not less.” 154 Indeed, a rights-based approach
to Third World human subject research cannot easily reconcile the informed consent
requirement with the demand for universal access to essential medical treatment.
The counterright of access to essential medical treatment renders the informed
consent principle an indeterminate policy preference subject to debate, rather than an
indisputable and overriding “trump.” Kennedy writes:
“[T]he inquiry into how to concretize the abstract right occurs in the
presence of a countervailing right . . . This means that there are two
opposing concretization projects going on.‟” 155 One might believe
passionately in both the abstract right to informed consent and the abstract
right of access to essential medical treatment, but in the context of Third
World human subject research, the practical implementation of one right
inevitably leads to the derogation of the other. In such a situation, the
informed consent principle loses its inalienable quality, its “absolute[]
essential[ness]”,156 and instead “function[s] as no more than [an]
interest.”157
Resolution of the contest between the rights to informed consent and medical
access will ultimately depend on one‟s personal ideology. Kennedy explains that
“what determines the balance is not a chain of reasoning from a right or even from
two rights, but a third procedure, one that in fact involves considering open-textured
arguments from morality, social welfare, expectations, and institutional competence
and administrability.”158 For instance, one could easily assert that any of the
proposed informed consent reforms discussed previously would endanger the right
of access to medical treatment in the Third World, and then make a convincing case
against it on the basis of policy. African physicians, “desperate for a solution to the
AIDS pandemic,” made precisely this argument when objecting to “burdensome
informed consent procedures in the face of widespread death.” 159 Thus, an insistence
on the principle of informed consent does not free the regulation of Third World
152
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medical research from the realm of politics, nor does it provide a clear way forward
for the implementation of human subject protections. Instead, it entangles advocates
in difficult and subjective questions of how best to balance subjects‟ conflicting
interests in both personal autonomy and access to essential medicines. Such a debate
requires resort to “non-rights arguments”160 that depend on the preferences of the
observer. The suggestion that informed consent protections are self-evidently the
desirable approach to Third World clinical research wanes when confronted with the
competing claim of the participants‟ right to access medical treatment.
Cultural differences between the First and Third Worlds further reveal that the
informed consent standard is a uniquely Western concept, rather than a universal
right appropriate for all societies. Post-colonial legal scholar Makau Mutua has
argued that the notions of “human rights and Western liberal democracy are virtually
tautological,” and that this “exclusivity and cultural specificity necessarily deny the
concept [of human rights] universality.” 161 He notes that “[t]here is virtual agreement
that the early formulation and codification of human rights standards was dominated
by Western cultural and political norms.” 162 Indeed, the Nuremberg Code‟s pedigree
is distinctly Western, as it was born from a criminal trial presided over by American
judges, in which American lawyers prosecuted German scientists who committed
crimes against European victims. 163 The Declaration of Helsinki has been criticized
along similar lines.164 In fact, the International Conference on Harmonization, which
devised the GCP informed consent standards that the FDA applies to foreign
research, did not include any developing countries. 165 Thus, although it aspires to
universality, the informed consent requirement actually relies on a conception of
autonomous individuality that may not be applicable to more communitarian, or
even authoritarian, Third World societies. For instance, two Pakistani researchers
who studied informed consent procedures in Pakistan and Swaziland found that:
[R]esearchers were often forced to penetrate layer after layer of tribal
hierarchy and corrupted bureaucracy in order to obtain informed consent.
Sometimes they had to ask the village elders or the husbands of women
participants first, or employ police escorts, or have tea and snacks,
“regardless of the time it took.” Plus, they had to struggle with the fact
that some subjects don‟t have telephones, or permanent addresses, and
may even be afraid to sign their names.166
The researchers concluded that their findings “demonstrate[d] the inadequacy and
complexity of applying western-based concepts of informed consent to developing
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countries.”167 Far from a universal right, the informed consent requirement is a
culturally contingent concept that is frequently alien to societies in the Third World.
When commentators nevertheless advocate for a universal informed consent
standard regardless of local cultural context, they essentially espouse a form of
cultural imperialism. Mutua believes that “the unrelenting universalist push [for
human rights] seeks to destroy difference by creating the rationale for various forms
of intervention and penetration of other cultures with the intent of transforming them
into the liberal model.”168 He condemns this practice as “cultural imperialism.”169
Similarly, legal scholars have criticized enforcement of the informed consent
doctrine in Third World medical research as a form of “ethical imperialism” which is
not only ineffective, but may actually “undermine the nonindividualistic society‟s
fabric.”170 In a culture where men consent on behalf of their wives and daughters, 171
or local leaders consent on behalf of community members, 172 an insistence on
applying the informed consent requirement may itself violate the principle of
autonomy.173 Such a universalist approach would both “diminish[] an individual‟s
right to decide how and by whom decisions of consequence to his or her life are
made,”174 and disrespect the integrity of the community that participates in the
research.175 African physicians have thus “bitterly opposed the informed consent
standard, arguing that Westernized notions of informed consent merely impose a
form of „medical-ethical imperialism‟ on developing nations.”176 Instead, they prefer
to allow local health experts, bioethicists, and affected groups to assess the risks and
benefits of medical research.177 Because the informed consent standard is culturally
contingent, rather than universal, its reinforcement in Third World clinical trials
would exacerbate a potentially destructive form of “ethical imperialism.” The
informed consent requirement does not protect an inalienable and universal right;
instead, it reflects a contestable policy judgment premised on a set of uniquely
European cultural values and balanced against Third World citizens‟ interests in
obtaining healthcare through participation in clinical studies.
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C. A Critique of the Possibility of Informed Consent in Third World Research
The fact that a lack of healthcare frequently drives human subjects in the Third
World to submit to medical research belies the notion that the informed consent
requirement meaningfully protects their free choice to participate. In practice, the
doctrine of informed consent does nothing to correct the radical power disparity
between researchers with the authority to dispense lifesaving pharmaceuticals and
their sick and impoverished patients. Given that participation in clinical trials is often
the only way for human subjects to obtain essential treatment, the informed consent
requirement merely masks the potentially compelled nature of all medical
experimentation in the Third World.
The life or death interest that many Third World participants have in submitting
to clinical research renders autonomy a meaningless concept. Feminist legal theorist
Catharine MacKinnon discusses the criminal law of rape:
The line between rape and intercourse commonly centers on some
measure of the woman‟s “will.” But from what should the law know
woman‟s will? . . . [W]omen are socialized to passive receptivity; may
have or perceive no alternative to acquiescence; may prefer it to the
escalated risk of injury and the humiliation of a lost fight; submit to
survive.178
Human subjects in the developing world, without other access to medical treatment,
must similarly “consent to survive.” The constraints of this reality undermine any
attempt to identify a legitimately “free” exercise of a subject‟s “will” to submit to
experimentation.179 Thus, the “written informed consent form” 180 by which the FDA
separates permissible medical study from nonconsensual research cannot fairly
represent the “voluntariness” of a subject‟s decision to join a clinical study. The
choice between life and death is not much of a choice at all. George J. Annas, head
of the health law department at Boston University‟s School of Public Health,
remarked:
I‟d argue you can‟t do studies ethically in a country where there is no
basic health care . . . You can tell a person there that this is research, but
they hear they have a chance to get care or else refuse their only good

178
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chance at care. How can you put them in that position and then say they
are giving informed consent?181
In rape, Mackinnon suggests, “the issue is less whether there was force and more
whether consent is a meaningful concept.”182 The same question could be asked of
Third World human subject research. “The best evidence of voluntary, informed
consent is when some subjects drop out or refuse to participate in a trial.” 183 Yet in a
survey of researchers working in developing countries, “45 percent reported that
their low-literacy subjects never refused to participate.”184 One doctor who worked
for Pfizer in Kano asked, “[g]iven [the study‟s subjects] poverty and lack of access
to decent medical care, „Honestly, did they have a choice?‟” 185
In the absence of meaningful autonomy, the informed consent requirement
instead serves to conceal the often-compelled nature of participation in Third World
medical study. Research inherently entails more risks than standard medical
treatment, since subjects may receive an inert placebo or a potentially dangerous new
drug. Thus, “only those who „have absolutely no choice‟ can be expected to agree to
the impersonal care doled out in a random trial . . . And these mostly poor patients
who serve as subjects live in a world apart from the socially powerful doctors who
experiment upon them.”186 In regard to rape law, Professor Dorothy Roberts argues:
“the pervasive effect of male dominance makes it impossible to say definitively that
some of women‟s sexual relations with men (called sex) are „free‟ and others (called
rape) are „coerced.‟”187 Similarly, the desperate need for medicine in the Third World
makes it impossible to discern where consensual experimentation ends and
exploitation begins. The “inequality of knowledge, authority, and wealth between the
researcher and the volunteer”188 renders the informed consent principle more an
ethical protection for pharmaceutical companies than a material one for human
subjects. By marking off and condemning one form of clinical study—
nonconsensual experimentation—the informed consent requirement justifies a much
broader range of effectively compelled medical research on disempowered Third
World patients.
The current FDA regulations of informed consent reflect this power imbalance
on a global scale. MacKinnon explains: “The law of rape divides the world of
women into spheres of consent according to how much say we are legally presumed
to have over sexual access to us . . . Little girls may not consent; wives must . . .
[D]ividing and protecting the most vulnerable becomes a device for not protecting
181

LaFraniere et al., supra note 39.

182

Mackinnon, supra note 178, at 880 (emphasis added).

183

SHAH, supra note 5, at 148.

184

Id.

185

Joe Stephens, Where Profits and Lives Hang in Balance, THE WASH. POST (Sept. 26,
2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/07/02/AR200707020125
5.html.
186

SHAH, supra note 5, at 119.

187

Dorothy E. Roberts, Rape, Violence, and Women’s Autonomy, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
359, 370 (1993).
188

Dyckman, supra note 111, at 98.

2012]

BEYOND NUREMBERG

147

everyone.”189 As previously discussed, the FDA similarly divides human subjects
into “spheres of consent.” American children receive the most protection, followed
by American adults, followed by the rest of the world. Accordingly, fewer and fewer
Americans volunteer for medical research. 190 Instead, the rest of the planet,
especially the unregulated Third World, is presumed available for experimentation
subject to baseline limitations.191 The signature on the informed consent form
effectively conceals the reality that the investigators who control lifesaving medical
treatment wield enormous power over their subjects, who must submit to
experimental research in order to survive.
The “informed” nature of the consent does not redeem it. In the law of rape,
MacKinnon writes, “If the accused knows us, consent is inferred . . . Men believe
that it is less awful to be raped by someone one is close to.” 192 Yet “women feel as
much, if not more, traumatized by being raped by someone we have known.” 193 By
analogy, the informed consent requirement recognizes as consensual a subject‟s
participation in a study if she has “sufficient knowledge and comprehension of the
elements of the subject matter involved.”194 Knowledge of the particular dangers of a
study, however, does not necessarily indicate the voluntariness of a Third World
subject‟s participation. Instead, the consent may well have been effectively
compelled by personal circumstances and may sometimes just terrify the subject. For
instance, one doctor recounted a study in Tanzania involving the administration of
HIV tests on pregnant mothers, in which government health officials requested that
the women not be told the purpose of the tests nor given the results. 195 She explains,
“The host country‟s decision was based on the judgment that the results could
provoke hysteria within the population about a disease with no cure and for which
limited resources were available, even for palliative treatment.” 196 Because the
subjects of Third World clinical research are often driven to submit by medical
necessity, rather than considered reflection on the risks and benefits of participation,
the fact that their consent is “informed” does not deprive it of its compelled
character.
Rather than define permissible medical research by the existence of a signed
informed consent document, one might consider the perspectives of the participating
human subjects. MacKinnon believes that:
A feminist distinction between rape and intercourse . . . lies in the
meaning of the act from women’s point of view . . . What is wrong with
rape is that it is an act of the subordination of women to men. Seen this
189

MacKinnon, supra note 178, at 878-79.

190

See SHAH, supra note 5, at 4-5.

191

Cf. Dyckman, supra note 111, at 107 (“[The Nuremberg Code and Declaration of
Helsinki] privilege societies rich enough to afford choice and autonomy. In this sense, the
doctrine does not embody Western values, but presumes privileged status.”).
192

MacKinnon, supra note 178, at 879.

193

Id.

194

The Nuremberg Code, supra note 17.

195

Barry, supra note 142, at 1084.

196

Id.

148

JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH

[Vol. 25:123

way, the issue is not so much what rape “is” as the way its social
conception is shaped to interpret particular encounters. 197
Similarly, medical research could be understood as nonconsensual if it feels that way
to the subjects themselves. In fact, one survey of women who enrolled in an AIDS
study in South Africa found that nearly 90 percent reported feeling “compelled to
take part, even though they all had signed an informed consent form.” 198 The same
survey revealed that 99 percent of the women “believed [that] the hospital would not
allow them to quit the study once it began.” 199 Despite the implementation of the
informed consent requirement, the perspectives of the actual human subjects
involved in Third World medical research reveal that they frequently experience the
clinical studies as compulsory.200 Because pharmaceutical trials often offer the only
sources of essential healthcare in the Third World, and many human subjects choose
to submit to experimentation for precisely this reason, the informed consent standard
only serves to legitimize compelled medical research in the name of an illusory
autonomy.
IV. BEYOND INFORMED CONSENT: DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE IN THIRD WORLD
HUMAN SUBJECT RESEARCH
Instead of a rights-based approach, advocates for human subjects‟ welfare might
consider the distributive consequences of medical research in the Third World.
Distributive justice in Third World medical research would address “the equitable
distribution of the risks and benefits arising from [the use of] underprivileged test
subjects in Western pharmaceutical research.”201 Although investigators conduct an
increasing amount of clinical studies in developing countries, comparatively little of
this research involves medicines to treat Third World maladies, or treatments that
would be affordable to a Third World consumer. Reform of the clinical testing
process based on the principle of distributive justice thus seeks to ensure that the
communities that bear the risks of medical experimentation also enjoy the benefits of
that research through access to affordable drugs for local illnesses.
The outcomes of the global economy for new drug research skew heavily against
the Third World. Developing countries disproportionately endure the dangers of
medical research in comparison to the benefits that such research yields for them. 202
Out of over 1500 new drugs developed worldwide between 1975 and 2004, only ten
were intended to treat diseases primarily prevalent in low-income countries.203 “This
indicates that during the past 30 years, that is, the period in which the involvement of
poor and low-income countries . . . has been the greatest, only slightly more than 1%
of pharmacological innovations were directed at diseases that predominantly affect
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the populations in these countries.”204 Scholars refer to this discrepancy as the “10/90
gap”205—of the $56 billion annual global expenditure on medical research and
development, 87% of the money targets the health needs of the world‟s richest
16%.206 Thus, rather than focus on Third World health problems such as malaria or
multidrug-resistant tuberculosis, “[t]he diseases that are of most interest [in
international clinical trials] are mainly the degenerative diseases—arthritis, obesity,
heart disease—the diseases of people in the developed world.”207
Even when Third World medical studies address diseases of local concern—such
as HIV or parasites—they often produce treatments that are too expensive for the
subjects‟ communities to afford. For example, one study conducted in Thailand led
to the development of a treatment to prevent the transmission of HIV from infected
mothers to their infants. 208 Yet the drug ultimately cost $50—far beyond the reach of
most Thai women, and thus, “useless for the community in which the test was
performed.”209 Similarly, a trial in Zambia of the drug nitazoxinade, used to treat
parasitic disease, yielded little long-run benefit for the community. 210 The treatment
was uniquely tailored to First World concerns and never licensed for use in
Zambia—“if [the pharmaceutical company‟s] hunt for experimental bodies had
ended in Zambia, their market clearly began elsewhere. The children of Zambia
shouldered the burden for nitazoxanide‟s development, but they are hardly
beneficiaries of the drug‟s advantages.”211 The fact that Third World nations often
cannot afford the drugs tested in their communities becomes especially poignant
when one considers that, after the desire to obtain medical treatment, the most
frequently reported reason that human subjects in the developing world volunteer for
clinical research is to “contribut[e] to finding better treatments for . . . people in the
participant’s country.”212 Even in the absence of any rights-based injustices, the
entire economy of globalized pharmaceutical research produces an inequitable
distribution of risks and benefits, as Third World subjects disproportionately bear the
burdens of medical research for the sake of First World consumers.
A distributive justice approach to human subject research reform would seek to
correct this imbalance by ensuring that the communities that undertake the risks of
medical research also share in the benefits. The International Ethical Guidelines for
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Biomedical Research Involving Human Subjects, promulgated in 2002 by the
Council for International Organizations of Medical Sciences in collaboration with
the World Health Organization,213 endorses such a policy. Guideline 10 states that
sponsors and investigators who undertake research in a community with limited
resources must make every effort to ensure that “the research is responsive to the
health needs and the priorities of the . . . community” and that “any intervention or
product developed, or knowledge generated, will be made reasonably available for
the benefit of that . . . community.” 214 Unfortunately, this language is fairly vague
and the principle has not been followed in most cases. 215 Nevertheless, scholars of
bioethics have begun to suggest specific policies to ensure more equitable outcomes
from Third World medical experimentation. These reforms include dissemination of
the results of clinical studies to participating communities, maintenance of a
favorable risk-benefit ratio for the regions where studies are conducted, post-trial
provision of medical treatment to human subjects if the experimental treatment
proves beneficial, and collaborative partnerships between First World investigators
and Third World research institutions. 216 These policies would begin to correct the
distributive injustices of the globalized economy for medical research. In the long
run, they could even increase access to essential healthcare in the Third World and
reduce the role that desperation for medical treatment plays in many subjects‟
decision to submit to experimental study, potentially providing a route toward
redeeming the informed consent requirement.
V. CONCLUSION: TOWARD A “KANO CODE”
The actual context of medical experimentation in the developing world
undermines both the inalienability and universality of such a right and the possibility
of true human subject autonomy. Advocates for the informed consent standard
present it as an absolute ethical imperative that trumps all competing considerations
and transcends cultural contexts. They claim that the requirement protects freedom
of choice by ensuring that a subject‟s participation in experimental research is
voluntary. The lack of healthcare in much of the Third World, however, implicates
subjects‟ competing “right” to access essential medical treatment, which potentially
conflicts with any straightforward reinforcement of the often-burdensome informed
consent standard. Moreover, the cultural differences between some First and Third
World countries suggest that the notion of informed consent may reflect uniquely
Western values, rather than a universal principle. The fact that many subjects
volunteer solely to obtain lifesaving medical care demonstrates that the informed
consent standard does not meaningfully protect autonomy, but instead conceals the
often compelled nature of participation in Third World clinical research. Thus, as an
alternative to a rights-based approach to the new drug testing process, the benefits of
213
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medical research to the Third World human subjects, who bear the cost, should be
more equitably allocated to advance the principle of distributive justice.
In light of this critique, the incident at Kano takes on a new significance. The
Nigerian plaintiffs sued Pfizer for allegedly violating their right to informed consent.
Yet, even if Pfizer had correctly followed the informed consent procedures, how
many sick and untreated patients would actually have turned down the offer of free
medicine? What material difference would informed consent have made in the lives
of the Nigerian children who had few other alternatives but to accept Pfizer‟s
experimental treatment? In fact, the informed consent standard loses much of its
meaning long before most Third World medical trials ever even begin; especially
since pharmaceutical companies commission studies to obtain FDA approval to
market new drugs in the United States, and simply choose developing nations as
testing sites because the countries have large numbers of untreated sick people on
whom to test the drugs.217 Third World subjects endure the risks of experimentation
for the benefit of consumers in the United States. This inequality embodies the true
injustice of Third World medical research.
One way the pharmaceutical industry might choose to correct this power
imbalance would be through the formation of a “multi-stakeholder initiative”
(MSI).218 An MSI is a form of “civil regulation” 219 that facilitates dialogue between
the various stakeholders engaged in a particular economic sector, such as
corporations, non-governmental organizations, governments, academics, labor
representatives, and affected communities. These parties then collaborate on
developing and implementing a set of human rights standards for the relevant
industry.220 Prominent MSIs include “The Fair Labor Association,” which addresses
working conditions in factories worldwide,221 “The Kimberly Process,” which
attempts to halt the flow of conflict diamonds from Africa, 222 “Fairtrade
217
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International,” which promotes trade justice, 223 and the “Extractive Industries
Transparency Initiative,” which attempts to improve transparency and accountability
in the extractives sector.224 An MSI for international medical research would bring
together private pharmaceutical companies, global health organizations, Third World
research institutions, human subjects, and local communities to collaboratively
develop a set of voluntary research standards for more equitably distributing the
risks and benefits of medical experimentation. Companies that followed these
standards would be certified as compliant and allowed to advertise their products as
such.225 Because human subjects and their communities would play an active role in
the process, the new research standards developed by an international drug testing
MSI would begin to resolve the power disparity that often undermines the informed
consent principle. First, the affected communities‟ own preferences would decide the
policy balance between expanded access to medical treatment and increased
regulatory oversight of clinical studies. Second, the new research guidelines would
reflect the values of the society in which the research took place, rather than an
imposed Western worldview. Finally, the human subjects would help craft their own
ethical protections—allowing them the opportunity to select how the research itself
would proceed, rather than the false choice of whether to accept lifesaving treatment
at all.226 A medical research MSI would empower Third World communities to
develop a “Kano Code,” a Nuremberg Code for the globalized pharmaceutical
industry.
Over half a century ago, the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg
promulgated the informed consent requirement in response to the human rights
atrocities that occurred during World War II. Today, an MSI-developed “Kano
Code” must address the new distributive injustices that accompany the international
market for clinical drug testing. A “Kano Code” would mandate that foreign clinical
studies more equally allocate both their risks and their benefits, on the basis of
specific directives derived from the interests of the affected communities and the
distributive reforms discussed earlier. A Kano Code would ensure that, although the
suffering children of Kano may not have had much choice as to whether to
participate in Pfizer‟s study, the children and their communities would at least share
in the knowledge and new treatments developed as a result of their participation. So
far, advocates for the informed consent standard have distinguished ethical
experimentation by the evidence of a “Yes,” nearly any “Yes” offered by a human
subject. Yet, as Nietzsche wrote, many patients in the Third World have a “hidden
Yes” inside them, fueled by a desperation for essential healthcare and stronger than
all “Nos” or “Maybes” that the dangers of medical research might otherwise
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warrant.227 In light of the increasing use of human subjects from the Third World, an
equitable process for new drug testing demands a reach beyond the principle of
informed consent, beyond “Yeses,” “Nos,” and “Maybes,” beyond Nuremberg, and
toward a more just economy of international medical research.
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